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ABSTRACT
Thomas Bacon, Frank Norris’s history teacher, wrote
that Norris recognized the power of individual will as well
as the dominance of natural law.
In McTeague, one of
Norris's early novels, the power of natural force easily
dominates the individual.
In The Octopus, written over five
years later, each character acts as he chooses, and Norris
holds him responsible for the outcome of his behavior.
The inclusion of a greater degree of free will does not
exclude The Octopus from the ranks of naturalistic works;
Norris still adheres to many conventions of naturalism.
In
fact, his use of natural forces, which at times seem to sway
the characters, often appears to rob them of their freedom
to act. But the freedom remains, evident in the way
characters learn how to correctly perceive the world they
live in.
Norris is often accused of philosophical inconsistency
in The Octopus, especially with regard to its ending.
By
exposing the inadequacy of an anti-social response, Norris
reaffirms the need for social awareness, and above all, an
acceptance of responsibility as a member of society.

THE PARADOX BETWEEN "SELF-SOVEREIGNTY" AND
"UNIVERSAL LAW" IN THE OCTOPUS

Frank Norris employed elements of Zola's naturalism in
all his major works, most notably McTeague
the time he published The Octopus
intentions considerably.

(1899), but by

(1901), he modified his

Norris wrote to I. F. Marcosson

that he planned to return to the "straight naturalism" of
McTeague^ to voice "an idea thats [sic] as big as all
outdoors."

2

Norris did not return to the literary theory

that guided him in McTeague, however, instead he creates a
different kind of naturalism that lacks the determinism and
fatalism that characterize McTeague.

The importance of the

characters' personalities increases in The Octopus, as well
as an urgency that they understand and interpret the real
ities of their social and natural environments.

In their

relationships to the forces that summarily crushed McTeague
and Trina, the main characters in The Octopus wield their
strength in the form of individual will.
Norris compares the literary theories behind The
Octopus and McTeague in the letter to Marcosson, declaring a
return "definitely now to the style of MacT," and revealing
a new-found certainty about his philosophical and literary
ideology:

"Now I think I know where I am at and what game I

play the best.

The Wheat series will be straight naturalism
3
with all the guts I can get into it."
Donald Pizer empha
sizes the "style" rather than "naturalism" of McTeague and
the link between McTeague and The Octopus, identifying the
latter as a "return to the strength and depth of Vandover
and McTeague" and as a representation of "a more balanced

2

view of man's failings and glories."

4

Norris did indeed know "where he was at" in The Octopus,
and, even if he wasn't smack in the middle of the natural
istic court, he certainly stood within its boundaries.
American naturalism is less easily defined than other
literary movements, perhaps because its diverse proponents
employ vastly different methods.

Its critics disagree

dramatically, but most agree on several characteristics
identified by V. L. Parnngton.

5

In American naturalism, an

objective, frank author writes a story in which the
character, usually a beefy, brainless worker or a neurotic,
moody artist, is subjected to deterministic forces (which
can be hereditary, environmental, natural, social, intan
gible, mechanistic, indifferent, cruel, or unfathomable),
that destroy him mercilessly.^

Malcolm Cowley identifies

such other common attributes as dualism, rebellion, love of
7
the massive, and irony.
Parts of McTeague and The Octopus
correspond to these definitions, as well as to Lars
Ahnebrink's summary of the contradictory elements of
naturalism:
It is varied and full of inconsistencies? strong,
ethical characters are contrasted with week,
passive figures dominated by forces beyond their
control? determinism is mingled with fatalism,
pessimism with optimism, gealism with lyricism,
Tendenz with objectivity.
Finally, in defining naturalism, its relationship to
realism and romanticism comes into question.

Christopher

Wilson considers naturalism "a synthesis of Romance and
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Realism."

9

Most critics tend to choose one of these theories

as more influencial to the naturalist.

Frederick Hoffman

sees the "mastery of fact" so common in realism to be a
characteristic of naturalism.^

Ernest Marchand, who

praises "the realism of McTeague," demonstrates the simi
larity of realism to naturalism, stating that "realism
becomes naturalism at the moment when it adopts a philosophy
of materialistic determinism."**

Nor does the naturalist

scorn romance, as Edwin Cady sees the realist, upon whom
"the sensibility of the romancer had been lost,"
to do.

12

chooses

Cady calls the naturalistic writer "a new romancer

in dealing with character." 13

And Norris himself admiringly

dubs Zola "the very head of the Romanticists."

14

Both

sensibilities, Realism and Romanticism, figure prominently
in Norris's naturalism.
In McTeague, as opposed to the romantic tendencies of
The Octopus, Norris employs naturalism tinged with realism.
He reveals the characters' most secret feelings— Trina's
awakening sexuality, McTeague's bewilderment in losing his
dental practice, Zerkow's growing excitement about the gold
dishes— in such a way as to render them impersonal and
obvious.

The author exposes private feelings so matter-of-

factly that even the most private emotions lose their
attraction.

Trina and McTeague begin as average people who

are then "twisted from the ordinary . . . and flung headlong
into the throes of a vast and terrible drama."

15

Their

demise results from bad luck, genetic predisposition, and

4

social convention, in addition to the forces of nature.

But

their own actions influence their fates very little, since
Norris endows neither with the moral capacity to create a
workable code of conduct.

In The Octopus, Magnus and Dyke

also contend with chance, heredity, and social pressure, but
their respective personalities matter greatly.

Dyke's lack

of care in business and his drinking (unlike McTeague, none
of Dyke's ancestors drank) cause him to lose his home and
eventually to turn to murder.

Similarly, Magnus is held at

least partly responsible for all that happens to him.
Although one feels as sorry for Magnus and Dyke as for Trina
and McTeague, blame falls only on the former pair.
In The Octopus, romantic theory emerges triumphant over
realistic inclinations.^
naturalistic novel . . .

Don Graham calls "the American
a romance in which the adventurers

never achieve clarity of illumination,"

17

which, in The

Octopus, some of the characters fail to do.

Norris argues

for the worth of Romance in The Responsibilities of the
Novelist (1903):
But
and
the
the
man

to Romance belongs the wide world for range,
the unplumed depths of the human heart, and
mystery of sex, and the problems of life, and
black, Y§searc^ie<^ penetralia of the soul of
. . . .

Norris opens The Octopus with a picture of the "wide world"
of the San Joaquin Valley, and allows Romance to wander
freely among the people who live there.

He reveals the

inner joy and heartaches, and makes known his characters'
responses, whether suitable or inappropriate, to the circum

5

stances that beset them.

Norris requires his characters to

contribute to the romance of The Octopus by creating them
with tortured hearts, repressed sexual longings and morally
weak souls worth healing.

H. Willard Reninger notes that

Norris1s theory about how a character perceives in The
Responsibilities of the Novelist is put into practice in The
Octopus.

Reninger emphasizes, as I do, the importance of

understanding the undercurrents of a character’s moral
environment:

"The problem, then,

itself to the question,
with?'

[of understanding] resolves

'What kind of eyes will you look

One can see actuality, but one can only perceive

reality." 19

In The Octopus, each character gets the oppor

tunity to perceive reality without being subjected to the
inexorable pull of external forces.
The Octopus reflects a basic paradox identified by
Norris's history teacher, Thomas Bacon.
"knew two things:

Norris, he wrote,

first, that the individual has self

sovereignty; second, that the universe is run by law, a law
which is absolutely certain, and which takes up into itself
and uses for its own ends the aberrations of the human
will."

20

In The Octopus, Norris does battle with the

paradox of free will and natural determinism.

21

Nature, in

Norris's mind, is moral and good in the end, and this theory
is backed by the theology and philosophy of the time— led by
LeConte, Fiske, Spencer— so naturalism as human subjection
to~-na tu r a-l— laws can be viewed as optimistic.

This optimism

also coincides with the view that nature will not hurt man

6

unless he rebels against it.

The problem, then, seems to be

that Norris is inconsistent in his optimistic naturalism.
In McTeague, the characters are "punished" even though they
submit to nature's laws, i.e. to "loving" each other, and
die miserably though they conform to biological and social
laws.

In The Octopus, Norris stresses over and over again

that n^turLe_JLs._JI.indifferent to the human swarm"

(p. 458) —

that_.it doesn't matter if one submits or rebels— but then he
asserts tha^.nature_JLs always working toward the good, as
evidenced by the death of S. Behrman.

I contend that there

is no inconsistency in either novel, and that Norris essen
tially changed his idea of "naturalism"— in so far as that
definition holds— from the deterministic naturalism in
McTeague to instructive, optimistic naturalism in The
Octopus.

In McTeague, American naturalism at its most

cohesive combines natural and„spcial forces to present
characters utterly without recourse against the blows^ of
fate, and subsequently stripped of their
due.

.ev o l u t i o n a r y

Jiuman

Thus unable to balance the higher and lower elements

of the human constitution, the characters in McTeague
succumb to their basest instincts— going backward, as Cowley
says

22

— to make up a novel of scientific observation, and

not even an objective one at that, since the blamelessness
of the characters elicits pity.

This is "naturalism" in the

style of pessimistic, materialistic determinism, and Norris
develops away from that pessimism in later works such as The
Octopus.

7

In The Octopus, Norris intentionally shows that the
determinism of his earlier works no longer suffices.

In

repudiating pessimistic naturalism, albeit in his charac
teristically repetitive and melodramatic way, Norris in The
Octopus does a deliberate about-face from the alternativelessness of the characters in McTeague.

Christopher Wilson,

in evaluating the success of an American naturalistic
literary tradition, identifies the need for the American
naturalist to teach a lesson, and to do so positively:
For all its apparent realism, Progressive-era
naturalism often denigrated accuracy in favor of
mere convincingness; for all its apparent
determinism, naturalism reflected positive think
ing, a triumph of the will.
In The Octopus, each character*s will defeats forces that
McTeague and Trina could not even have identified, much less
rebelled against.
In contrast to Donald Pizer's statement that The
Octopus "is more a novel about m a n ’s relationship to nature
than a story of man as a social being,"

24

The Octopus,

really does have a great deal to do with m a n ’s place in
society and his individual capacity for proper behavior.
The characters in The Octopus divide easily into those who
accept responsibility for their actions, and those who.,~~with
Norris’s help,^^.ame^narfeu-jja^or^man-made forces.

Walter

Fuller Taylor identifies the conflict Norris creates between
human will and determinism in The Octopus:
For, on the one hand, he interprets his story at
times by a philosophy of free will, according to
which life is a moral experience, and man a being
of importance; and, on the' other hand, he inter-

8

prets his story at other times by an optimistic
determinism, according to which life is an amoral
experience, and the individual man of ng^importance
in comparison to the total life-scheme.
I hope to show that Norris means life to be a moral experi
ence for which the individual is responsible, even though he
sometimes allows external agencies to creep in and attempt a
takeover.

The conflict between free will and fate deepens

as Norris tries to plumb the depths of the human heart,
unravel the mystery of sex, and solve the problems of life
while still clinging to elements of naturalism.

Natural

laws have some effect, but the majority of the action
involves man acting within initially unfamiliar social
systems to which he reacts in widely varying ways.
At issue here is not the fact that all characters have
responsibility; they do to some degree, as Richard Davison
states:
Man is responsible for combatting evil and moving
toward the good.
The railroad and the wheat are
neither responsible nor irresistible as mere
forces.
It is m a n ’s use of these forces that
results in evil or good. Men bribe railroad
commissioners and exploit the land. Neither
tenant farmers no^gailroad presidents are immune
to responsibility.
Were this the case in The Octopus— that all characters
clearly deserve blame for their actions, and that they and
their critics recognize their guilt— then, Norris would not
include the sweeping forces that affect his characters so
much that their ability to govern themselves appears to
fail.

One's level of responsibility matters in The Octopus.

Otherwise, Magnus would not be seized by an undefined

9

force— a "mesh" of confusion (p. 206)— that reduces his
culpability.

Mrs. Derrick's fortitude would not be compro

mised by comparisons to "the feather caught in the whirl
wind"

(p. 199).

Dyke, who ends an apparent victim of the

railroad, could simply put tail between legs and not even
try to keep his head above water until one of "those
millions of tentacles suddenly reaches up from below"
(p. 249) to choke him.

No need to stop at a kiss in the

dairy cellar? Annixter might as well satisfy his lust on the
spot, thus saving himself the anguish of self-inspection.
But he has the duty to behave humanly, not to give in to
instincts.

Similarly, such contagious responsibility

prohibits Vanamee and Presley from escaping so guiltlessly.
Norris extends a generous share of accountability to each
character, but employs as well powerful external forces that
weaker .characters are glad to blame their failures ..upon.
Different aspects of reality exist in the world of The
Octopus.

Perceiving one's particular world correctly,

whether in moral, artistic, or spiritual terms, gains
unprecedented importance.

Early in the novel, Norris

defines perception, the key to awareness, when he describes
Annixter's first view of Magnus's plowing team:
Annixter's eyes made out a blue [sic] on the
horizon to the northward? the blue concentrated
itself to a speck? the speck grew by steady
degrees to a spot, slowly moving, a note of dull
color, barely darker than the land . . . .
As the
spot grew larger, it resolved itself into constit
uents, . . . its shape grew irregular, fragmen
tary . . . .
The click and clink of metal work
was incessant . . . the column approached nearer?
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was close at hand . . . .
The noises mingled to a
subdued uproar, a bewildered confusion, the impact
of innumerable hoofs was a veritable rumble . . .
machine succeeding machine . . .; fecundating the
living soil? implanting deep in the dark womb of
the earth the germ of life, the sustenance of a
whole world, the food of an entire people.
(pp. 127-8)
This early passage sets the tone for the way Norris's
characters discover reality. 27

Not only do details become

apparent by "slowly moving" "steady degrees," but those
details are at best "fragmentary," eliciting "a bewildered
confusion" as an initial response.
Norris directs his characters by carefully doling out
events, ideas, and circumstances.

The good that could

result— an honest deal, an ideal love, a calmer spirit, a
higher understanding— must, just like the "germ of life,"
first make its way through the "subdued uproar" that consti
tutes each person's confused existence.

Unlike in McTeague,

most experiences are viewed in one all-encompassing glimpse?
in The Octopus, characters come to know what is happening to
them in measurable degrees.
photographs:

Scenes in McTeague are like

McTeague looking at Polk Street, a yielding

Trina in the clutches of her lustful suitor, Zerkow along
the water's edge with his bag of junk.
events occur with cinema-like motion.

In The Octopus,
Annixter's transfor

mation, Magnus's capitulation, Dyke's criminal behavior come
to mind as scenes with many parts, not as a single event.
Norris still employs sweeping natural forces that crush men,
and powerful instincts that compel characters to revert to

11

animalistic behavior, but the forces and instincts are now
tempered by each character’s growing responsibility to
understand life and act accordingly.
In Magnus Derrick, Norris creates a character with
definite strengths and weaknesses, a man aware of his
potential, but careless enough to ruin what he might accom
plish.

By placing him within the context of a rigidly moral

worldview, Norris forces certain restrictions upon him— that
is, Magnus must conform to the moral standards he sets for
himself.

Yet merely conforming to his chosen creed does not

necessarily insure success, as NQrris demonstrates in
drawing Magnus's character.

Indications that Magnus has

failed to achieve great success crop up throughout the early
stages of Norris's characterization.

Magnus falls short of

business and political aspirations (p. 50)? in one of his
initial business attempts, for example, "he had sold out his
interest at a small profit— just in time to miss his chance
of becoming a multimillionaire"

(p. 50).

He runs his ranch

by luck rather than by science, deeming fertilization and
fallow fields "niggardly, Hebraic, ungenerous"

(p. 52).

Eager to claim sole credit for his fortune, he unwisely
discharges all his tenants.

He continues to make rapid

decisions and commit rash acts, even though in the past such
behavior has led to financial losses, or at the very least
missed fortunes.

His suggestion to the ranchers that if "we

act quickly, there may be a chance"
he has learned from his mistakes.

(p. 79) shows how little
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Magnus, all too aware of his unrealized ambitions, sees
this last gamble for power as tantamount to "his ambition at
length gratified, his career, once apparently brought to
naught, completed? success a palpable achievement"

(p. 133).

In addition to listing Magnus's disappointments in life,
Norris sets the stage for his slow demise by stressing two
of his apparently antithetical personality traits.
Magnus's love of honesty and his reliance on luck
create a paradox:

the honest approach prohibits his leading

the League of ranchers who will bribe commissioners in order
to lower rates? but in addition to the excitement of a
gamble, membership in the League seems at the time the only
hope for economic dominance.

Magnus values honesty as much

as he loves the thrill of the gamble.

These two qualities

are constantly at war with each other in a fight to achieve
a similar goal— to be the leader of other men.

The desire

to hazard everything on the hope of colossal returns"
(p. 51) crops up each time Magnus questions the wisdom of
assenting to the other ranchers'

"scheme of bribery"

(p. 80).

His initial response to the proposal shows his pleasure at
being "looked to . . .

as the natural leader, their chief,

who was to bring them out from the abominable trouble"
(p. 87).

References by others to his commanding nature

occur throughout the text (pp. 132, 172, 177, 192).
himself as "leader at last, king of his fellows"

He sees

(p. 227)

when he dreams of the possibility of sending wheat to China.
Driven by the need to command, and despite "his championship
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of justice and truth, his respect for law, Magnus remained
the gambler, willing to play for colossal stakes, to hazard
a fortune on the chance of winning a million"

(p. 211).

Previously, he commanded respect through honesty; now, his
"honesty, rectitude, uncompromising integrity [prevail] for
the last time against the devious maneuvering, the evil
communications, the rotten expediency of a corrupted insti
tution"

(p. 85) and then falter.

Magnus succumbs to evil not from a predilection to
follow the crowd, or from natural outside forces, but from a
personal decision he makes in a state of considerable
agitation.

When Magnus's desires conflict, his grasp on the

realities at hand dim.

The pressures to lead, to take

chances, and to be honest emerge from within his own person
ality.

These are qualities he develops during his lifetime,

each desire so dominant that it clouds Magnus's decision
making powers.

Critic Warren French attributes Magnus's

failure directly to his (and Shelgrim's)

inability to

recognize their own imperfection, explaining that their
"offense was not that they deliberately did wrong but that
because of adolescent self-infatuation, they failed to
perceive the limitations of their own powerful gifts."

28

Early in the conflict he firmly rejects being "party to a
scheme of avowed bribery and corruption"

(p. 81), but

decides to condone discussion of it anyway because Harran,
whom Magnus is "so accustomed . . .
expresses interest.

to listening to"

(p. 81)

Harran's interest causes the initial

14

confusion, as Magnus, so used to taking Harran's advice,
allows his firmly held, continually reinforced honesty to
diminish slightly.
Magnus faces a second paroxysm of confusion when he
weighs his chance to succeed against the possibility that he
might damage his reputation.

He torments himself night and

day in contemplation of the alternatives:

"his cherished,

f

life-long integrity, the unstained purity of his principles?
At this late date were they to be sacrificed? . . .
. . . to neglect his chance meant failure"
Magnus faces a moral choice.

And yet

(p. 134).

Here

William Vance considers

Derrick ill-equipped for the trials Norris assigns him,
possessing a "specific flaw" that forces upon him a "dilemma
. . . [that] is fully tragic."

29

But Vance fails to recog

nize that the gambling side of Magnus is not necessarily a
flaw but a commensurate part, indispensable to the character
Norris has created, and, with regard to his success So
far— being the dominant economic and social magnate in his
area— generally an advantage.

30

If Magnus does have a

"flaw," it is his inability to recognize that he must at all
costs conform to the standards on which he has grounded his
reputation.
Norris does not require perfection in his characters;
as I will demonstrate later, Annixter makes several grave
mistakes, yet reconciles them when he realizes he is wrong.
Similarly, Magnus, as Annixter loudly proclaims, is a fool
for "giving his tenants the bounce, and working Los Muertos

15

himself"

(p. 26), but he still ends up with a "bonanza" crop

(p. 433) for the railroad to seize. 31

In these cases of

minor human error, Norris does not intrude with external
forces that seem to compel Annixter or Magnus to a certain
32
action.
Soon after Magnus agrees to consider the scheme
of bribery his wife begs him for a promise to stay out of
the whole business, which he cannot give.

Using phrasing to

implicate Magnus as a pawn of fate, Norris describes his
inner turmoil:
Already he was entangled, already his foot was
caught in the mesh that was being spun.
Sharply
he recoiled.
Again all his instincts of honesty
revolted. No, whatever happened, he would
preserve his integrity.
(p. 135)
Eventually Magnus agrees to lead the League amidst "a vast
thunder of savage jubilation"
one forces him to sign.

(p. 200), but nothing and no

Magnus has to choose between what

is right and wrong in a moral context.

There will be

unpleasant repercussions if he sticks by what is right, but
if he reflected more deeply on that ingrained honesty on
which he so depends, and recognized that he has to operate
within the laws of his self-defined morality, then he could
have saved himself.

When Norris disturbs Magnus's moral

decision with controlling forces, it serves as a reminder of
how easy it is to blame anything besides ourselves.

Norris

fully recognizes Magnus's guilt, and his moral weakness.

He

intrudes a second time with the powerful "mesh" that appears
to be determinism, but really just comes from conflict with
Magnus's mind:

16

He was hopelessly caught in the mesh. Wrong
seemed indissolubly knitted into the texture of
right.
He was blinded, dizzied, overwhelmed,
caught in the current of events, and hurried along
he knew not where.
He resigned himself.
(p. 206)
Clearly, Magnus weaves his own mesh, and personally unleashes
the current of events that engulfs him.
When Magnus resigns himself to corruption, his physical
condition reflects his mental turmoil.
he has "aged suddenly"

Increasingly unaware,

(p. 2 80), and trembling and stopped,

begins to "consult his lieutenants . . . distrusting his own
opinions"

(p. 281).

His last confrontation with reality

occurs in a theatre dressing room, where he sits, "an old
man, broken, discarded, discredited, and abandoned"
fully aware that "he had failed"

(p. 393).

(p. 394),

For all the

pathos of his demise, Magnus himself decided upon the course
that brought him to this point; he is "by his own hand,
undermined"

(p. 393).

In short, conflict exists not between

Magnus and fate, but between facets of Magnus*s personality.
A divergence in method between The Octopus and McTeague
appears in comparing Magnus’s degeneration to those of
Zerkow in McTeague and Dyke in The Octopus.
an ambition similar to Magnus's:

Zerkow exhibits

he seizes upon a fantastic

vision of great wealth, in the form of gold dishes, and
gears his activities exclusively toward realizing that end.
He will not accept the impossibility of his dream, but
becomes lost and insane instead.

Similarly, Magnus doggedly

pursues a goal of wealth by less-than-honorable means, and
ends an insane man.

The difference lies in the decision

17

Magnus makes and the period of guilt he experiences after he
realizes his mistake. 33

Magnus consciously decides upon

pursuing his goal because "to seize it meant achievement,
fame, influence, prestige, possibly great wealth"

(p. 134).

By his own strength of will, Magnus maps out a course he
feels will be successful.

Zerkow has no such goal, being

motivated instead by a base, unreasoning greed that even
tually overpowers what little mental faculty he possesses.
By dint of repetition, "he comes to believe Mariafs story
infallibly.

He was immovably persuaded . . . .

In his

perverted mind, the hallucination has developed still
further"

(p. 187).

Zerkow never recognizes his foolishness.

When he dies, "clutched in both his hands was a sack full of
old rusty pans, tin dishes"

(p. 247).

Magnus also proceeds

to oblivion? though he lives on, it is with the painful
"consciousness of lost self-respect, the knowledge of a
prestige vanishing, a dignity impaired"

(p. 323).

Magnus

suffers shame for his actions before he becomes a "shambling,
stooping, trembling old man"
suffers.
poison.

(p. 396).

Zerkow simply

Magnus is his own victim, because he chooses his
Zerkow cannot help himself.

Dyke’s misfortunes illuminate the responsibility which
falls on particular characters.

He may lack a good mind for

business, but Norris endows him with enough horse sense to
know that he has to play by the rules.

Vance, assuming that

Norris has failed to give Dyke adequate abilities, sees him
as "so clearly intended as an illustration of the minimal

18

'struggle for survival'

. . . that the philosophical dogmas

of naturalism begin to control both the reactions and the
ensuing events entirely apart from any question of probability."

34

In so pigeonholing Dyke, Vance fails to take

into account the opportunities Dyke ignores that could have
prevented his ruin, and the circumstances that lead up to
his eventual degeneration.

By failing to determine the rate

of hops, Dyke lets himself in for the disaster he acknowl
edges might result.

When Harran reminds him "to have a

clear understanding with the railroad about the rate"
(p. 57), Dyke agrees, "I had better be sure of that"

(p. 57).

Yet, only several days later, after he has already farmed
his land for hops, does Dyke finally check "to make sure
what your rates on hops are"

(p. 143).

He feels nervous at

having waited so long and begins "to blame himself that he
has not long before determined definitely what the railroad
would charge"

(p. 143).

Dyke has enough brains to know that

the rate must stay the same in order for him to make a
profit.
Dyke is ready to accept blame after his initial ruin,
reconciling his loss with the earlier statement that "he was
not much of a business man; that he managed carelessly"
(p. 143), but then "his tardy rage flames up"

(p. 249), and

he begins to think "By God, no, it was not his fault?
he had made no mistake"

(p. 249).

[that]

By this time, though,

Dyke's culpability has been established.

Even though he

evokes sympathy, even though "the insatiate greed of the
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monster"— the cruel railroad Norris inserts as a scape
goat— has contributed to Dyke's misfortune

(p. 249), he

still has made his own decision to "make money" (p. 243)
from hops.

The subsequent scenes involving Dyke conform

quite closely to Norris's naturalistic experiments, as the
ruined Dyke turns to drink and violent crime, and eventually
gains the "instinct of pursuit"

(p. 280) that the hunted

McTeague also finds as he flees into the desert, but the
unfortunate consequences do not invalidate Dyke's initial
freedom.

Unlike McTeague, Dyke had other options; he could

have asked for help, farmed on a smaller scale, waited
another year, or even humbled himself enough to ask for his
job back since he was able to swallow his pride enough to
borrow money from the railroad.
Until they become mentally infirm, Dyke and Magnus take
responsibility for their actions, but the natural forces so
prevalent in McTeague still act upon them.

Norris requires

that all characters reckon with the major forces in the
book, the wheat and the railroad.

Magnus regards the wheat

as nothing more than a means to make money; he is the type
of rancher who "had no love for their land, but to get all
there was out of the land, to squeeze it dry, to exhaust it"
(p. 212).

Unlike the other major characters, he never

speaks of the wheat as a force that affects him, but rather
as a profit producing body that he controls.

His reaction

to Cedarquist's proposition typifies his attitude toward the
wheat in general.

Magnus thinks that people should manipu-
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late the wheat, rather than be influenced by it:
The torrent of wheat was to be diverted, flowing
back upon itself in a sudden, colossal eddy,
stranding the middleman, the entrepreneur, the
elevator and mixing house men . . . .
He saw the
farmer suddenly emancipated, the world's food no
longer at the mercy of the speculator, thousands
upon thousands of men set free of the grip of
trust and ring and monopoly.
(p. 226)
Magnus, certain that he and his fellow ranchers can them
selves cause the wheat "to be diverted"

(p. 226), never

considers the wheat an irrepressible force.

He anticipates

freeing the farmer from the hold of "the speculator . . .
the grip of trust and ring and monopoly"

(p. 226).

In

Magnus's last reference to the wheat before hearing of the
court defeat, he sees his
bursting upon Asia"

(emphasis mine) wheat . . .

(p. 227).

that works itself out,"
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There is no "terrible drama

as Norris boldly claims drama must

in naturalistic fiction; on the contrary, in Magnus one
finds a character bent on making the drama of life work for
himself.
Magnus is convinced that he exerts control over the
railroad.

Such confidence is not unusual in characters in

naturalistic novels, who brazenly challenge external forces
only to be crushed mercilessly by them.

Magnus does not

control the road, but neither does it destroy him as an
impersonal force? Norris carefully develops Magnus's char
acter as the culprit, not the blind force of the machine.
Although he devotes little time to introspective delib
eration about it, Magnus's ideal view places Shelgrim in
balance with a theoretically honest Railroad Commission.
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The railroad lacks its usual inscrutability when seen
through Magnus's eyes, who cautions that "it is to the
Railroad Commission that the people of the state must look
for relief . . . .

Once elect commissioners who would be

loyal to the people, and the whole system of excessive rates
falls to the ground"

(p. 79).

Men control the railroad, and

since men can also control other men, Magnus assumes he has
the problem licked.
Magnus, the other ranchers, and of course the railroad
men all have a voice in the distribution of the wheat.
Prostrated not by the force of the wheat but by the
self-created force of their own stupidity, carelessness and
greed, they react with righteous indignation when their own
lack of expertise prohibits managing the two cooperating
forces.

Joseph McElrath explains the foolish behavior that

brings the ranchers to an unfortunate, but plausible, ruin:
The irony is that Magnus, the time-tested gambler
who should have known better, accepted the hand
craftily dealt by the railroad without understand
ing the nature of the game— its spoken and unspoken
rules . . . .
The ranchers greedily and blindly
rushed in where competent capitalists would n e v e ^
tread.
They voluntarily ran the gambler's risk.
The "voluntary" actions of the ranchers burden them with the
responsibility of being able to choose.

Natural forces

little influence them.
Although his characters do accept blame or credit for
the results of their behavior, Norris does not completely
have done with FORCE.

In Mrs. Derrick's character, Norris's

Spencerian ideology rears its persistent head.

Magnus's
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wife, though strong enough to have withstood the "droning,
heartbreaking routine of the class and music room"

(p. 47),

and self-sacrificing enough to return to such odious work,
lacks control over her life.

Norris describes her as

industrious but relatively unambitious:

"by disposition she

was retiring? she easily obliterated herself.
made for the harshnesses of the world"

(p. 47).

She was not
She cher

ishes but one ambition— to go to Italy— yet she takes no
action toward that goal save marrying Magnus and "following
his fortunes"

(p. 47).

Her lack of initiative might be

attributed to her sex, but one look at Hilma's robust vigor
eliminates femininity as the sole reason behind her inertia.
Yet, when Magnus collapses into senility, Mrs. Derrick,
"listless, apathetic and calm with the calmness of a woman
who knows she can suffer no further," goes back to work
because her husband "can hardly take care of himself, to say
nothing of me"

(p. 437) , demonstrating a previously unseen

aspect of her personality— the ability to take charge when
necessary.
Besides her antithetical personality, Mrs. Derrick
serves a second function with regard to the symbol of the
wheat.

As the only character, except perhaps S. Behrman at

the very end, to regard the wheat as evil, and the first
character to describe her feeling about this powerful force,
she serves to dispel the opinion that the wheat represents
only good.

Her view bypasses the enthrallment Vanamee and

Annixter feel when they link fulfillment in love with "the
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eternal green life of the growing wheat bursting its bonds"
(p. 277).

Her thoughts are closer to Presley's idea at the

end that the wheat is "indifferent to the human swarm"
37
(p. 458.
By examining Mrs. Derrick's reaction to the surrounding
wheat, the reader perceives that Norris diverges from the
naturalism of McTeague.

Initially, Annie thinks the wheat

an unmercifully evil force, as it can be— but only when men
use it so, not of its own accord.

But, "To her mind there

was something inordinate about it all, something almost
unnatural.

The direct brutality of the wheat . . . stunned

her a little"

(p. 48).

Mrs. Derrick finds the wheat lewd

and frightening, as "indecent [as]

. . . the unconscious

nakedness of a sprawling primordial Titan"

(p. 48).

She

also recoils from what she senses to be a deliberate harsh
ness toward people in the "direct brutality" of the wheat.
She later modifies her opinion slightly about the relation
ship between man and nature:
She recognized the colossal indifference of
nature, not hostile, even kindly and friendly, so
long as the human ant swarm was submissive,
working with it, hurrying along at its side in the
mysterious march of the centuries.
Let however,
the insect rebel, . . . and at once it became
relentless, a gigantic engine, a vast power, huge,
terrible . . . .
(p. 130)
Forces like the wheat do not take pitiless vengeance on a
man when he tries to alter the system in The Octopus.

They

are much too impersonal and ambivalent to human behavior to
affect man in a naturalistic way.

In McTeague, nature

reacts personally and integrally? it doesn't wait for human
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rebellion before it strikes.

The mountains envelop McTeague

at the end without his disobedience,

"their immensity, their

enormous power, crude and blind, reflecting themselves in
his own nature, huge, strong, brutal in its simplicity"
(p. 298), Nature turns vicious without provocation as
McTeague then enters an "awful sink of alkali [that] was
openly and unreservedly iniquitous and malignant (p. 327).
Nature in McTeague brutalizes man regardless of his actions;
in The Octopus, at least man must first rebel.

In The

Octopus, Norris moves away from an overtly hostile natural
world.

Although Norris picks up a McTeague-like thread in

The Octopus, especially in the character of Mrs. Derrick,
who, like McTeague, exhibits that utter helplessness before
the force of nature, he rejects the premise of McTeague that
dictates complete compliance with natural forces and with
chance.

At the end Annie is so strong and resilient and

seems so aware of the possibilities they had and lost that
she proves human independence.

She knew that Magnus’s

capitulation would mean ruin, but her actions could not
change Magnus's.

Even though Norris features natural forces

as part of Mrs. Derrick's motivations, the awareness he
gives her seems to contradict the determinism so reminiscent
38
of McTeague.
The naturalistic theories that only slightly alter The
Octopus rigidly govern the minds and bodies of the charac
ters in McTeague.

Donald Pizer describes McTeague and Trina

as essentially powerless to direct their lives, since, being
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"caught up by drives and instincts beyond their control or
comprehension, they mate by chance rather than by will." 39
Norris stresses this point, too:
Yet neither of them was to blame.
From the first
they had not sought each other.
Chance had
brought them face to face, and mysterious instincts
as ungovernable as the winds of heaven were at
work knitting their lives together. Neither of
them had asked that this thing should be, that
their destinies, their very souls, should be the
sport of chance . . . .
But they were allowed no
voice in the matter.
(p. 74)
Such lack of control represents the general naturalistic
tone of McTeague.

Instinct couples behavior with inner,

unlearned motivation; innate urges replace thoughts.
McTeague and Trina must settle for the mystery of a world
they cannot hope to affect.

No differences between mind and

body exist here; when McTeague moves "slowly, ponderously,"
his mind "was as his body, heavy, slow to act, sluggish"
(p. 7).

McTeague falls victim to "mysterious instincts";

Magnus's strong will allows him to conquer instinct and plan
out his actions, however faulty they turn out to be.
Annixter exhibits a lack of awareness very similar to
Mr. and Mrs. Derrick's, but he realizes the truth before he
loses that which is most important to him.

Magnus's greatest

desire is to achieve prominence through political power; he
commits wrong as a consequence.

Annixter grasps the reality

of most situations, but fumbles about within the context of
romantic love.

Before he can react properly to the ideal

love he and Hilma will eventually share, he drifts from
unbridled lust to vague desire.

Ultimately he comprehends
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the true emotion of all-embracing love.

Norris again places

a character within a moral world, and expects him to behave
properly, but initially, Annixter is not equipped to do so.
He roughly tries to kiss Hilma at first, and then to make
her his mistress, two unacceptable acts in the moral world
that love for Hilma eventually enables him to occupy.
Annixter changes in two converging ways.

As his desire

for Hilma sharpens, his capacity to love widens as well.
Annixter*s pre-Hilma personality is "rough almost to
insolence"

(p. 24); he is thoroughly contemptuous of others'

needs and opinions.

His overall greed, exhibited in his

conversation with Ruggles, makes him appear just as
profit-hungry as Shelgrim:

"I can't take advantage of that

rise in value so long as you won't Sell . . . .
blocking me"

(p. 141).

You're

Well aware of the reality of the

business world, Annixter's knowledge does not help him
understand Hilma.

He loses all his brashness when near her:

he is "smitten dumb as soon as she entered the room, gluing
his eyes upon his plate, his elbows close to his side,
awkward, clumsy, overwhelmed with constraint"

(p. 62).

This

initial infatuation, obviously of a physical nature— he
ogles "the sweet feminine amplitude of her breast"

(p. 65)—

manifests itself in three episodes of selfish conduct.

He

exhibits particularly irrational behavior when he tells
Delaney "to pack off, you understand, and do it lively"
(p. 70).

His two trespasses against Hilma, the kiss and the

offer to take her as his mistress, represent a completely
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false understanding and provoke the severest reaction from
her.

Only then does Annixter start to think.
Annixter*s transformation entails the lessening of the

lustful desire so antithetical to Hilma*s morality.

Since

he "at one time had known perfectly well what he wanted"
(p. 256), his realization that now "the goal of his desires
had become vague"

(p. 256) torments him into action.

Forced

to abandon his previous notion that "marriage was a form
less, far-distant abstraction"

(p. 258), Annixter attains

understanding through the power of his own reason.
once someone with whom "he imagined an affair"
becomes "an ever-present reality"

(p. 258).

Hilma,

(p. 63),

The events of

the year have brought him to such a high degree of altruistic
ripeness that he finally desires "to make someone happy"
(p. 258).

He comes to this understanding not by accident or

mandate, but because, as Charles Child Walcutt writes, he
possesses certain "*spiritual elements' that defy explanation in terms of heredity and environment." 40

He decides

that he wants to be a part of her world, a world of morality
that transcends his own.

Even Annixter himself attributes

his metamorphosis to a person, not a force? he changes
"because of Hilma, and because we cared for each other"
(p. 330).41
Although forces do not determine Annixter*s new percep
tion, Norris still imposes them on his story.

When he

affirms Annixter*s resolution to give himself to Hilma, he
links the impetus of that burst of life with the force
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behind the wheat.

The wheat burst forth from the ground at

the same time Annixter realizes that he loves Hilma:
Once more the Titan, benignant, calm, stirred and
woke, and the morning abruptly blazed into glory
upon the spectacle of a man whose heart leaped
exuberant with the love of a woman, and an exulting
earth gleaming transcendent with the radiant
magnificence of an inviolable pledge.
A0
(p. 260)
But one can hardly take comfort in the words that precede
this benediction:

"the earth, the loyal mother, who never

failed, who never disappointed, was keeping her faith"
(p. 260).

Like as not, the harvest will fail and the "force

of the world" leave millions far from revivified.

Even at

the beginning of the book, mother earth has disappointed,
Magnus "having raised no crop to speak of for two years"
(p. 27) because of dry conditions.

Annixter's joy, when

viewed this way, takes on a temporary, uncertain quality
foreign to the love he has achieved.

Norris's intrusion

might be best explained by his characteristically bad
writing in describing scenes of great joy.

The wheat

analogy works to an extent, but advocates of its natural
istic force will find that the correspondence between its
force and Annixter's love break down if taken too literally.
Annixter's "transformation" really just means that he
learns and willingly accepts a new standard of behavior.
This knowledge comes gradually.

Annixter does not change in

one night; Hilma's loving presence has brought him step by
step toward the one night when he finally realizes how
changed he has become.

Thus, unlike the wheat field
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"unbroken by a single green shoot"
and heart have indeed been pricked.

(p. 260), Annixter's mind
43

Not only has the seed

been planted "in that rugged composition, confused, dark,
harsh"

(p. 258), it has begun to germinate long before this

moment.

Annixter shows remorse over the attempt to kiss

Hilma, telling her "I want to be friends with you.

I made a

bad mistake," and begging her to "not think that I am a
galoot and a mucker
(p. 149).

[and]

...

be friends with me"

In the barn before Delaney, Annixter looks into

Hilma's eyes and "from that moment on,
cared"

(p. 184).

. . . knew that Hilma

Annixter responds to the concern reflected

in her eyes with a yearning less sexual than he previously
demonstrated.

An even kinder, if still unenlightened,

Annixter promises his trusting lady, "I'll take care of you"
(P- 236), only to find himself, after insulting her, alone
by the creek.

After these events, Annixter's mind begins to

expand.
How men deal with the external forces that act upon
them depend on personality traits developed consciously.
The wheat itself acts more as a catalyst for Annixter's
enlightenment than as a deterministic natural force.

The

success of his love affair with Hilma results largely from
the preceding changes in Annixter's personality.
formation of this sort appears in McTeague.

No trans

Mr. Grannis and

Miss Baker also find true love, but only after two years of
imagined courtship.

They have ignored the truth, refusing

to cling to false hope, but, nevertheless, their love has
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grown.

They finally declare their love when Miss Baker

feels compelled to go to Mr. Grannis because "it seemed to
her that he was wanting her"

(p. 250).

She moves at the

appointed time, almost like an automaton; she requires no
thought or reason, but goes as if predetermined.

As William

Dillingham stresses, "It is the same 'malicious fate' that
destroys the others in the book that also brings them
together." 44

They discover then that what they imagined

false for so long was actually a reality.

What seemed until

this moment to be fancy has all along been fact.

They find

happiness as if it had been decreed.
Characters in The Octopus prefer to cling to their
personal visions rather than face reality.

Until forced by

circumstances, they choose not to confront the truth.
Magnus faces ruin and collapses before he understands.

His

wife shares the failure she anticipated, but did not know
how to prevent.

Annixter fears the permanent loss of Hilma

before he recognizes the love in his heart.

Dyke loses all

his money after learning too late to be careful in business.
Each of these characters, unlike those in McTeague who never
have to know reality or act responsibly, either has to
change or face his come-uppance.
capable of change.

But they are at least

Two other major characters in The

Octopus, also given full responsibility for their actions,
never undergo permanent improvement or decay, existing
instead in a social vacuum, ignorant of anyone's needs but
their own.

Both Vanamee and Presley exhibit a frightening
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unawareness of the world around them.

Although Norris

flatteringly describes them as "both out of tune with their
world, dreamers,

. . . groping and baffled amid the perplex

ing obscurity of the delusion"
hardly merits praise.

(p. 156), their blindness

Vanamee and Presley, along with

Shelgrim, voice the conclusion of The Octopus, but because
they lack the awareness Norris demands, they profess a false
creed.
Norris describes Vanamee as "a young seer,

...

a

half-inspired shepherd of the Hebraic legends, a dweller in
the wilderness, gifted with strange powers"
pp. 29, 99, 446).

(p. 154, also

He, of all the characters, seems to be

least influenced by hostile natural forces, simply because
he lives harmoniously with them.

Endowed with the ability

to noiselessly call people to him at will, and so in tune
with nature that he can feel "a vibration merely, faint,
elusive, impossible of definition, a minute notch in the
fine keen edge of stillness"
the self-sovereign man.

(p. 272), Vanamee also embodies

But closeness to nature does not

constitute an awareness of all of reality? Vanamee lacks
knowledge of the social and moral environment that surrounds
him.

Other characters misjudge situations, but eventually

they either see the falsehood and recant, or they deterio
rate.

Vanamee does neither, preferring the falsehood over

the truth.

He even begins the quest for Angele by

confessing that "He was ready to be deluded? craved the
hallucination? begged pitifully for the illusion"

(p. 110)?
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in accepting her daughter he satisfies his craving at the
expense of truth.
Norris demands in The Responsibilities of the Novelist
that in romantic fiction an author must above all "create a
truthful impression."
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He skillfully prepares us for the

Vanamee sections, thus suspending our disbelief that such
supernatural occurrences are possible in the story.

Norris

sacrifices, as Christopher Wilson writes, the "real life" he
admires, satisfying instead "a nascent consumer culture’s
fascination for 'image* over reality, for credibility over
truth— not for sincerity, but only what looks like it."
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Vanamee*s special powers, though not real in the strict
sense of the word, still emerge as quite valid in the
context of The Octopus.

His ability to call someone to him

against her will serves as evidence of Vanamee's capacity
for self-determination; his ability to sense her approach
outlines his natural sensitivity.
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These two qualities are

as much a part of Vanamee's personality as Magnus's need to
take chances and be honest.

Such extraordinary powers

initially seem as deterministic as the sexual instinct in
McTeague, but they involve much more than an involuntary,
uncomprehended response.

Although Vanamee "can't tell

exactly how" these powers work, he confidently claims,
don't understand these things yet"

"we

(p. 30), implying that

not only are they explainable, but that eventually we will
understand them.

Vanamee is quite certain at times that "I

am stronger than death, and that if I only knew how to use
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the strength of my will, concentrate on my power of
thought— " (p. 109), he could bring Angele back.

He

attributes to himself his success or failure in calling
someone, not to the force behind the power.

When he can't

immediately reach Angele, "at first he thought this was
because he had allowed his mind to go slack"

(p. 113).

Vanamee "allows" his will to falter and commands his powers
to obey:

Norris makes it very clear that Vanamee has

control over his gift.
Vanamee1s special ability brings characters besides
Angele's daughter to him.
asks about how it works

The power intrigues Presley, who

(p. 30), and frightens Father

Sarria, who finds it disturbing that "my own will can count
for so little"

(p. 102).

Vance calls attention to the way

Norris realistically sets up Vanamee1s abilities:

"strange

possibilities have been fully prepared for by scenes in
which Vanamee previously exercised his mysterious 'sixth
sense' by summoning Presley and Father Sarria on separate
occasions, from a distance and from sleep."
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Once Vanamee

has drawn these two to him, they greet him warmly, the
surprise at being manipulated giving way to joy at seeing
their friend.

Since the power works so well on the living,

Vanamee tries it on his dead Angele:
he summoned her to him"

(p. 113).

results in a vague answer,

"as if she were alive,

This initial attempt

"a change--mysterious, illusive"

(p. 115), but nevertheless an encouragement to Vanamee, who
assumes Angele has responded.

He enters into a ritual of
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nightly calling, believing "that his outstretched hands,
groping in the darkness, met the touch of other fingers"
(p. 270)— fingers that belong to a necessarily physical
apparition.
For Vanamee demands only the body of his beloved.
Their love is grounded in the physical? in the early days of
their courtship, "mere words were useless between them.
Silently, as his reaching hands touched her warm body, he
took her in his arms, searching for her lips with his"
(p. 33).

Granted, Norris writes romantically about their

love, and Vanamee, and probably Angele, enjoy special
communicative powers, but the wordlessness of their inter
course only serves to define even more sharply the over
riding sexual attraction between the two.
care to converse with or about Angele.

Vanamee doesn't

He willingly

comforts Presley with optimistic ideas about good triumphing
over evil, but he refuses to describe Angele's return
because "To put this story, this idyll, into words, would,
for me, be a profanation"

(p. 447).

Presley, to whom an inability to express oneself is
like death (p. 36), imagines Vanamee's inner turmoil, made
worse by the fact that "there were capabilities in Vanamee
that were not ordinarily found in the rank and file of men.
Living close to nature . . . there developed in him a great
sensitiveness to beauty and an almost abnormal capacity for
great happiness and great sorrow"

(p. 32).

Vanamee's

receptiveness to his surroundings enables him to persevere
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in his nightly summons when the answer on "some nights . . .
failed him entirely," or at best was "faint, illusive"
(p. 270).

His sensitivity to the natural world draws him

away from others into "the reach of the desert and red hill,
the purple mountain, the level stretch of alkali, leper
white, all the savage, gorgeous desolation of the Long
Trail"

(p. 31).
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Vanamee1s way of life excites Presley,

who, visualizing his epic in Vanamee's recitation of his
travels, exclaims,
with you"

"How I should have loved to have been

(p. 35).

It seems that Vanamee truly lives his

art, in accordance with Norris's conviction that "life is
better than literature."
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Vanamee implies the superiority

of experience over art when he asks Presley, "But why write?
Why not live in it?"

(p. 35).

Vanamee certainly experiences

a great deal in his travels, but his life, "living in the
desert, in the wilderness, a recluse, a nomad, an ascetic"
(p. 34), completely excludes other people.

Vanamee, as

responsive and well-travelled as he is, does not "live" in
the way Norris demands.
cross-purposes.

He and Presley discuss life at

Presley, for all his sterile aestheticism,

wants to write an epic that emphasizes the social environ
ment, as well as the natural,
isolated towns,

"the strenuous, fierce life of

. . . the song of the people"

(p. 35).

Vanamee speaks primarily of nature, and aloneness in nature
at that.

Vanamee gets what he wants in the end, but Norris,

instead of presenting Vanamee as a role model or a spokesman,
ironically shows him a failure:

one who, though glorified
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for his wide-ranging experiences, wrongly prefers a "life"
of social isolation.
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We have already examined the nature of Vanamee's
commitment to Angele while she lived; his desire for her
after her death illustrates an even stranger kind of love.
Vanamee expresses a basically lustful desire for his
beloved:
She comes to my imagination only as what she w a s ,
material, earthly, as I loved her.
Imperfect you
say? but that is as I saw her, and as I saw her, I
loved her? . . . I don't want her spiritualized,
exalted, glorified, celestial.
I want her.
(p. 105)
His feeling for her is desire for her body, the way she
looked:

"as I saw her, I loved her."

Quite a few critics,

Vance among them, object to the facility with which Vanamee
meets and falls in love with Angele's daughter:
[Angele's daughter]
Other.

"She

is not Angele's 'very self'? she is half

Moreover, she has been wooed through suspicious

means by a man old enough to be her father.

To ignore all

this is to be satisfied with the cheapest sort of romance."
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In fact, Vanamee confesses that he wants only her body, not
her soul:

"I would rather be unhappy in the memory of what

she actually was than be happy in the realization of her
transformed, changed, made celestial"

(p. 105).

Norris, and

Sarria, excuse Vanamee's desire on the grounds of malnutri
tion and social isolation (p. 108) , but even after "he came
to himself"

(p. 108), and separates from Sarria, he suffers

"a longing for Angele, for some object around which his
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great love could enfold itself"

(p. 110).

So much desire

for the physical is rather like the attraction Annixter
initially feels for Hilma, when "to his surprise he found
himself thinking of her after he had gone to bed that night,
and in the morning when he woke up he was bothered to know
whether he had dreamed about Hilma*s fine white arms
overnight"

(p. 62).

Vanamee's similar desire, for "her

whole dear body giving itself into his embrace? her lips
against his? her hands holding his head? drawing his face
down to hers"

(p. 114), constitutes the culmination of his

love, whereas Annixter's yearnings mark the beginning.
Vanamee's last scene celebrates the physical union between
himself and the object he has found to fold himself around,
Angele's daughter:

"He ran forward to meet her and she held

out her arms to him.

He caught her to him, and she, turning

her face to his, kissed him on the mouth"

(p. 449).

Vanamee's overwhelming need to experience "the sound of
her voice, the touch of her hand, the clasp of her dear
arms, real real"

(p. 105) causes him to cast about for any

way he might possibly achieve this.
to Vanamee, hoping to comfort him:

Sarria quotes Scripture
"Thou fool, that which

thou sowest is not quickened, except it die:

And that which

thou sowest, thou sowest, not the body that shall be, but
bare grain,

...

spiritual body"

It is sown a natural body? it is raised a
(p. 106).
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Vanamee hears only the first

part— that the body sown is not the body that shall be— and
conveniently ignores the second— that the dead body shall be
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raised as a spiritual body, not as a physical one.

He

verbally makes the link between Angele and the sown body
when telling Presley about the response he has sensed; "lost
in a reverie," Vanamee "just above a whisper murmured:
. . that which thou sowest is not quickened; except it
die" . . . and she— Angele . . . died1" (p. 155).

When

Angele's daughter appears, he repeats the verse again,
including his own interpretation:
Why had he not had the knowledge of God?
"Thou
fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened,
except it die."
So the seed had died.
So died
Angele.
"And that which thou sowest, thou sowest
not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it
may chance of wheat, or of some other grain." The
wheat called forth from out [sic] the darkness,
from out the grip of the earth, of the grave, from
out corruption, [sic] rose triumphant into light
and life.
So Angele, so life, so also the resur
rection of the dead.
(p. 277)
Omitting the line "it is sown a natural body; it is raised a
spiritual body," Vanamee comes up with a plausible metaphor.
Angele is like a seed, dying, rotting, and corrupting the
earth"

(pp. 276-7), and her look-alike daughter represents

the resurrection of the buried seed, the "life springing
from her death— the pure, the unconquerable, coming forth
from the defiled"

(p. 277).

Were Vanamee to leave it at

that, to simply see the daughter obviously delivered of
Angele and then live in unshakeable Christian faith, he
might be a trustworthy spokesman for the book.

Unfor

tunately, his behavior afterward indicates an inadequate
grip on the reality of love.

As Don Graham points out, "the

daughter is not the mother and there is something disturbing
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about Vanamee's willingness to accept the surrogate for the
real thing." 54

Furthermore, neither are grains of wheat;

they are individual women with identities quite separate.
But since all along he only wanted to regain the body of
Angele, her daughter's appearance more than satisfies
Vanamee.

In his last scene, he celebrates the reality of

"Angele in the flesh, vital, sane, material"

(p. 448),

secure in the knowledge that he has won "the simple honesty
of a loving trusting heart"

(p. 449)— heart, perhaps, but

surely not soul.
Vanamee ends his first glimpse of Angele's daughter
with a jubilant recitation of ICorinthians 15:55, "Oh death,
where is thy sting?
(p. 277).

Oh grave, where is thy victory?"

Fully convinced that he has seen death vanquished,

Vanamee feels little concern for the fact that the woman who
appears is not the woman he has been calling.

He also

conveniently omits the lines leading up to his exaltant
shout:

"When the perishable puts on the imperishable, and

the mortal puts on immortality, then [and only then, I add]
shall come to pass the saying that is written:
swallowed up in victory"

(ICor. 15:54).

Death is

The appearance of

Angele's daughter, mortal, perishable, signifies no victory?
she is only another example of Vanamee's remarkable powers
of will.

His mind, packed with visions of those perplexing

eyes and that three-cornered white forehead, wills that such
a creature come, and she does.

The "lesson" learned, that

"Angele was not the symbol, but the proof of immortality"
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(p. 276) teaches nothing.

Angele*s daughter is as mortal as

they come, and Vanamee wants her that way.
no miracle here, no resurrection.
from Angele, but she is not her.

There has been

Angele’s daughter came
For Vanamee to accept her,

and then to link her emergence with that of the wheat,
demonstrates oblivion to death's finality.
Vanamee, confident in his doctrine of deathlessness,
preaches a comforting, believable sermon to Presley just
before they part.

He renounces death, deeming it "only the

absence of life"

(p. 447) and implores Presley not to "judge

the whole round of life by the mere segment you can see.
The whole is, in the end, perfect"

(p. 448).

Be that as it

may, it provides no satisfactory explanation for why almost
everyone else in the book suffers so.

James K. Folsom

explains how worthless Vanamee's doctrine is to the people
dying around him:
In contrast to the death and supposed rebirth of
Angele we have the killing of the sheep by the
train, . . . the futile deaths of Osterman and
Harran Derrick and the insanity of Magnus Derrick,
and the living death of life imprisonment for
Dyke.j-c111 none of these cases does death bring
life.
Folsom goes on to note the death of Hooven, and the subse
quent death and ruin of his wife and daughter, and the death
of Annixter which precipitates the death of his unborn
child, a death completely opposite to the survival of
Angele's child.

Folsom concludes by saying that the

"answer" then is not in Vanamee's blithe acceptance of a
somewhat twisted Scripture reading, but in the demand for
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"social justice" seen in Mrs. Dyke's words and her granddaughter's copybook.
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But Folsom, and other critics like

McElrath, who tend to put Vanamee above or below or somehow
outside of reality, thereby declaring his opinions "irrele57
vant to the principal concerns of The Octopus,"
brush
aside too quickly Vanamee's very tangible presence in The
Octopus.

Norris takes pains to give Vanamee a real person

ality, responsibility for himself and others

(men as well as

sheep), and palpable influence on another important
character.

Vanamee touches too many other lives and has too

great an introspective capacity to be considered "irrele
vant."

Nor are his final words meaningless? everyone likes

to believe "that it is not evil, but good, that in the end
remains"

(p. 447).

Still, this remark conveys little

knowledge to its hearers.

What is missing is the conviction

that each of us must contribute toward the good that will
manifest itself in the larger view.
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For Vanamee to invest

all his effort in calling up a reincarnation of Angele is
for him to miss the point entirely; the largest view he
cares to see is that of an Angele look-alike, untouched by
years, ready to make love to him.

Although Vanamee comes

very much back in touch with the reality of his physical
desire, he never quite matures enough to behave responsibly.
Presley also demonstrates emotional immaturity, prefer
ring the easiest lifestyle he can maintain.

Though cer

tainly not Norris himself, Presley clearly speaks for the
author through much of the novel.

Introspective and obser
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vant as a writer must be, Presley articulates for himself
the thoughts and feelings Norris must describe for the other
characters.

Authorial comments with regard to this character

decrease; Presley demonstrates by his own thought and speech
the strain between personal responsibility and external
force.

Norris tells us how Magnus and Annixter feel and

thus has the opportunity to use phrases that seem at times
to absolve them of their free will.

Presley reveals his own

feelings, and, like the dichotomy seen in the other
characters, often ascribes his motivations and deeds to
external forces.
Perhaps it is because Presley exposes his own innermost
emotions that he appears so ineffectual and indecisive; his
own anxiety about his faults naturally emphasizes them.

But

Presley's early characterization intimates a weakness far
deeper than modest anxiety.

Norris tells us right off that

"Just want he wanted, Presley hardly knew"

(p. 15).

Artis

tically, Presley demands of himself a work quite anti
thetical to his personality.

He, a man who finds the

ranchers, "their lives, their ways, their marriages, deaths,
bickerings" "odious . . . beyond words"

(p. 10), wants to

create an epic that speaks with:
. . . the
voice of an entire people . . . their
legends, their folklore, their fighting, their
loves and
their lusts, their blunt grim humor,
their stoicism under stress, their adventures,
. . . their direct, crude speech.
(pp. 13-4)
The romance of the everyday that Norris demands in The
Responsibilities of the Novelist attracts Presley, but he
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cares so little for the ordinary mechanics of the working
man's day that he hears only the drone and not the voice of
the people whose story he wants to tell.
In his life, as in his art, Presley never decides which
path to take.

He determines his behavior by appropriating

the theories of others more strongly opinionated than
himself.

Described initially as "morally . . .

of that sort

who avoid evil through good taste, lack of decision and want
of opportunity"

(p. 13), when Presley finally does act,

committing evil, it is only because he allows passionate
emotions to overrule refined inertia and the influence of
Caraher to create the opportunity.

In fact, what Presley

thinks is largely determined by the company he keeps? as
Granville Hicks stresses, "Presley hovers on the edge of the
struggle, now repelled, now drawn in, and at last takes
refuge in his mystical optimism."
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Before he arrives at

the final borrowed theory, Presley has espoused the ideas of
nearly every participant in the struggle.

His earliest

sympathies lie with "the poet," who is besieged by the
credity of ordinary man and deflowered by a stultifying
school system (p. 35).

Then for a time he becomes united

with the ranchers in "hatred of the railroad [that] shook
him like a crisp and withered reed” (p. 218), compelled by
Cedarquist to "a blind exasperation" at the "languid indif
ference of the people"

(p. 218) , thereby modifying his

earlier detachment from the railroad and his first hope of a
vital Western population.

He retracts his initial disdain
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for Caraher, telling him "you are the only one of us all who
is right"

(p. 377), only to see him later as "a plague spot

in the world of the ranchers"

(p. 436).

Presley even

believes the enemy, considering Shelgrim's rationalistic
drivel reasonable— "it rang with the clear reverberation of
trust"

(p. 405).

In summary, Presley willingly devotes

himself to the most interesting and "romantic"
Norris's terms)

(not in

idea available, and, as Vance says, "all

this vacillation (of which there is much more) only intensifies Presley's confusion about his role as a writer." 6 0
The confusion Presley struggles through to find his
place as a literary man provides the best medium through
which to examine his failure to understand reality.

Because

he relies on the written word to define his experience for
him, Presley is sorely hampered when unable to find the
right form to express his thoughts.

The early pages are

full of his search for the meat of his epic.

He produces

the short poem "The Toilers" after devoting himself solely
to journal writing so as to avoid "suffocating"
lack of written expression.
solution.

(p. 36) from

Yet what he writes brings no

No longer thinking as a poet, for whom beauty of

expression alone can satisfy the criterion for great art,
Presley uses his journal to rail "against injustice and
oppression,

. . . with not one sane suggestion as to remedy

or redress"

(p. 218).

He tries oral expression in the heat

of inspiration, but he does not reach "the hearts of the
audience"? instead, he talks "as he would have written"
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(p. 389).

He tries various modes of expression, and in only

one does he begin to succeed.
In "The Toilers," we see Presley at his finest.

It

does not detract from his success that his poem was
"discussed, attacked, defended, eulogized, ridiculed . . .
parodied (p. 277), and finally "distorted so as to read as
an advertisement for patented cereals and infant1s foods"
(p. 278).

It did invigorate "the people," and that, for its

kind of literature, is highest praise.

He achieves even

more through this poem by inspiring two ladies to start "a
movement to send a whole shipload of wheat to the starving
people in India"
fame"

(p. 426).

Though he "had no thought of

(p. 278) in the writing of "The Toilers," he finally

turned the tables on failure, and, though unwittingly,
inspired a beneficial deed.

In this way, Presley demon

strates possession of a gift that can change the seemingly
inevitable course of the world.

At the beginning he has no

words to describe the wild notions in his b r a i n . L a t e r ,
when he finally grasps what he needs to express in "The
Toilers," he succeeds in affecting his environment.

When he

laments in his journal the impotence of mankind, and "our
little struggles, our moment's convulsion of death agony
[that] causes not one jar in the vast, clashing machinery of
the nation's life?

. . . the momentary creak of the axle is

the mother's wail of bereavement, the wife's cry of
anguish— and the great wheel turns"

(p. 379).

Were Presley

able to continue to channel his anger in such a way, he
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might more often inspire others.
Angered because the railroad suppresses the rancher's
side of the story, Presley echoes Shelgrim, declaring that
no one can

stop the tide of improbability that thenewspaper

story will

start, just as no one can stop the railroad and

its injustice:
Tell them [the people], five years from now the
story of the fight between the league of the San
Joaquin and the railroad and it will not be
believed. What! a pitched battle between farmer
and Railroad, a battle that cost the lives of
seven
men? Impossible, it could not have
happened.
Your story is fiction— exaggerated.
(p. 379)
Presley, as the only character in the book given the ability
to express himself in prose, has the responsibility to make
known the story and to make it believable.

"The Toilers"

demonstrated his skill at writing to move people; even his
speech at the League meeting, though impersonal, holds the
attention of its listeners.

The writers are the ones who

must insure that the great wheel i^ disturbed, that the
mother's wail ^s heard, and that these things make a differ
ence.

It is too easy to blame everything on forces and

chance.

Norris might seem to endorse such influences, but

at the same time he endows all his characters, including
Presley, with specific skills that can alter the progress of
"pre-determined" forces.
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Presley could help others by

distributing information from his journals in layman's
terms; he simply chooses not to.
After Presley decides he cannot help anything by
writing, especially in view of the fact that "the story of
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the fight, the story creating the first impression, was to
be told to San Francisco and the outside world by S. Behrman,
Ruggles, and the P. and S. W. agents"

(p. 381), he chooses

to aid the cause by throwing a bomb through S. Behrman's
window.

He realizes later that this course of action was

wrong, but yet he still does not resolve to help set to
rights the situation that so infuriated him.

Instead, he

leaves "Bonneville and the sight of the ruin there"

(p. 396).

Presley bears the responsibility to make people aware of the
evils that have been done, not merely to whine about them or
to scribble them down in a notebook for none but himself to
see.

All the nonsense about deterministic forces might be

comforting, but the responsibility to disseminate the truth
falls directly upon the shoulders of the individual.
The same strain— between force and will— exists in the
treatment of Presley's character as that of the other
characters, only that, as mentioned before, Presley intro
duces external forces himself, thus relieving Norris^of the
task.

Presley likes very much to lose touch with his

intellectual side.

As romantic as Vanamee, but lacking in

the same responsive powers, Presley rarely communes with the
natural world.

Occasionally, as in his reverie on the

mountain's summit, he gives himself up to his environment:
"the sense of his own personality became blunted, the little
wheels and cogs of thought moved slower and slower? con
sciousness dwindled to a point, the animal in him stretched
itself"

(p. 37).

The experience continues as Presley seems
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to become a force himself, "to dominate a universe, a whole
order of things"

(p. 39).

Of course, this power is abruptly

removed by the intrusion of brutal reality— the death of the
sheep on the tracks— and Presley comes crashing down from
the "sudden uplift"

(p. 39) of the Muse.

As much as Presley

wishes to remain aloof from the real troubles of the world,
either through a union with nature, or by rebelling against
the mechanism of the railroad, the pressing circumstances of
reality draw him down to earth.

He even realizes for a

short while that he might help his friends of he were to
"range the entire nation, telling all his countrymen of the
drama that was working itself out on this fringe of the
continent,

. . . rousing their interest and stirring them up

to action"

(p. 278).

Presley never manages to dedicate

himself in this way, allowing instead the "other affairs
near at hand . . .

to absorb his attention"

(p. 278).

Before Presley goes away, he decides to find and help
Minna Hooven.

Upon discovering her after she has become a

prostitute, he chastises himself, imagining "that he was, in
a manner, marked; that he was foredoomed to fail"

(p. 44).

Filled with inward loathing at his inability to act, he
seeks to blame a "mesh" similar to that which Norris ascribed
to Magnus.

Presley, of course, is not "foredoomed to fail,"

but rather allows the weaknesses in his personality to
triumph over the strengths.

In the case of Minna, whose

decay brings Presley to the preceding rationalization, his
arrival after the fact need not keep him from aiding her.
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In fact, as he tells Mrs. Gerard later, "One need never be
afraid of being too late in the matter of helping the
destitute” (p. 426).

Granted mores were different in the

1900*s, but a "fallen woman" could at least be made more
comfortable financially even if she could not be restored to
social respectability.

Presley's willingness to give up,

and his uneconomical self-abasement for being a coward and a
loser, has no practical application at all.
Presley blames what he considers his failure on pre
vailing natural forces.

By the end of the novel, Presley

has found so many powerful external forces to blame that he
goes off to India scot-free.

Norris, and Presley, have

moved from a virtually autonomous human existence, wherein
"natural forces seem to hang suspended [and]
stubble had no force even to rot"
where "FORCE only existed"

. . . the very

(p. 16), to a universe

(p. 446), and he is blameless.

It is all very well for Presley to believe that individual
men cannot alter the course of the world, but then neither
can he say that good or bad will win out, because forces
know no good or bad.

After Lyman betrays the league,

Presley muses about man's ineffectiveness as compared to the
force of the wheat, resigning himself and others to unimpor
tance before its greatness:
Indifferent, gigantic, resistless, it moved in its
appointed grooves.
Men, Lilliputians, gnats in
the sunshine, buzzing in their tiny battles were
born, lived through their little day, died and
were forgotten? while the wheat, wrapped in
nirvanic calm, grew steadily under the night.
(p. 316)
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The visit to Shelgrim confirms Presley's belief in nature's
culpability.

Fully convinced by the ogre in the skullcap,

Presley leaves the office even surer that nature is to
blame, or at least partially contributes to life's horrors:
Forces, conditions, laws of supply and
demand— were these, then, the enemies after all?
Not enemies; there was no malevolence in nature.
Colossal indifference only, a vast trend toward
appointed goals. Nature was, then, a gigantic
engine, a vast cyclopean power, huge, terrible, a
leviathan with a heart of steel.
(p. 406)
These words of despair are not much different than those he
uses to describe the railroad early in the novel after it
kills the sheep (p. 42), nor are they a development from
Mrs. Derrick's realization that nature turns hostile if men
are not submissive to its force.
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All are simply rational

izations developed by the characters to extricate themselves
from blame, and employed by Norris to demonstrate the
rejection of responsibility.
Both Presley and Mrs. Derrick leave Los Muertos, but
Mrs. Derrick, "listless, apathetic [and] calm" as she is
(p. 437), at least goes with the knowledge that she will be
responsible for the welfare of another as well as for
herself.

Presley just sort of goes, barely responsible for

himself much less for anyone else.

His encounter with

Hilma, in which he resolves "to be strong and noble because
of her"

(p. 443), might be construed as an awareness of the

possibilities of his life, but his advice to her on even
tually becoming "more noble, a truer woman, more generous"
(p. 443) is hypocritical when viewed in conjunction with the
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creed Presley upholds.

At the time, Presley is sure that he

will change for Hilma.

Don Graham describes his transforma

tion as "a genuine conversion of the heart, sparked by
emotion and corroborated by intellect," adding later that
this is "not one of his characteristically impulsive
responses."
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He links Presley*s dedication to Hilma with

Annixter*s, but such a correspondence seems unlikely.

First

of all, in both Vanamee’s and Annixter*s revelations of
love, many steps and much soul searching is required.
Presley has spent quite a bit of time examining his reaction
to the world*s force, but comparatively little in thinking
about Hilma.

Norris might better have prepared for a union

between Presley and Hilma than by adding "without realizing
it, he had been from the first drawn to Hilma, and all
through these last terrible days,
continually upon his thoughts"

. . . she had obtruded

(p. 443).

We have been

included "continually" in Presley’s thoughts "all through
these last terrible days" and Presley hasn’t given a thought
to Hilma.

Also, Presley has given us no indication up to

this point that he ever sticks with a particular theory, and
just because it*s the end of the book, there is no guarantee
that h e ’ll stick this one out either.
Presley sails away to India, preferring the delusion
that forces dominate all, and men— -"motes in the sunshine"
(p. 457)— nothing.
not changed at all.

The basic tenets of his personality have
In characterizing Presley, one sees

immediately that he does not know what he really wants in
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art or in life.

Presley is torn between "his ambition to

portray life as he was it— directly, frankly, and through no
medium of personality or temperament"

(p. 15) and his desire

"to see everything through a rose-colored mist— a mist that
dulled all harsh outlines, all crude and violent colors"
(p. 15).

He wants life to be like the landscape he surveys;

for "everything in the range of his vision . . . [to be]
overlaid with a sheen of gold"

(p. 38).

Certainly he will

portray the truth; but only if, as he wishes, his truth be
sweet.

How much easier for him to absent himself from the

ugliness of Bonneville, fortified by a doubtful, hesitant
assertion that "all things surely, inevitably, resistlessly
work together for good"
for good; men do.

(p. 458).

But "things" don't work

Saving a thousand lives in a "far-distant

corner of the world"

(p. 458) doesn't make Annixter’s death

any easier to bear.

And falseness, injustice, and oppres

sion do not just die, or fade away, or vanish by themselves
(p. 458).

Warren French reminds us that "the forces at work

are not necessarily uncontrollable

(Marchand points out that

'the growing of wheat is not a cosmic process, but a purely
human activity'), but they cannot be controlled by the
characters Norris has created."
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Presley's love of the

"rose-colored mist" is not an instinct, nor a result of some
pre-determined fate, but a weakness in his personality put
there by Norris, Presley must learn to overcome his irre
sponsibility or settle, as he does, for failure.
The "straight naturalism" of McTeague is not present in
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The Octopus.

Even though Norris may have intended to

portray man as a victim of the determining natural forces so
strong in McTeague, in The Octopus, as Hicks writes, still
"he wavers between the view that his [man's] surrender is
ignoble and the view that it is inevitable.

In the end,

the see-saw tips down in favor of the ignobility of man's
surrender? natural„.forces do not determine his life, but
jtterely a ffect it as does a traffic jam or an illness.
Norris develops a separate identity for each character in
The Octopus, and though he intrudes with conflicting external
forces, he basically demands that each do right within his
personal standards.

The delusions, hallucinations, illu

sions, misjudgments, and indecisiveness demonstrated by each
character come from within.

Norris takes care to create

characters sufficiently equipped morally to overcome initial
faults.

In no circumstance can a character in The Octopus

say, as Trina can in McTeague, "It's stronger than I"
(p. 164) , though some try to ignore reality and avoid blame
for their behavior and its results.
Norris uses none of his characters as actual spokesmen
for the philosophy behind The Octopus, choosing instead to
systematically undercut the apparent solutions the more
vocal characters offer.

Joseph McElrath discounts the words

of the characters appearing at the end, stating that in no
way could Norris "sanction Shelgrim's, Vanamee's or Presley's
facile answers to the questions raised by the plot."
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Shelgrim conveniently attributes all wrong to external
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agencies:

"the wheat is one force, the railroad another,

and there is the law that governs them— supply and demand"
(p. 405).

He lumps all external forces together as culpable,

and he depends upon them to make his excuses and his fortune.
Vanamee proclaims "good"— nobility, love, sacrifice, gener
osity, truth (p. 447)— eternal, and "the whole round of
life . . . perfect"

(p. 448), but he demonstrates none of

these "good" qualities in his relationship with Angele’s
daughter, nor does he actively contribute to life in any way
that benefits any but himself.

Neither is Presley Norris’s

spokesman; he only increases the deterministic pall by his
belief that "forces rather than men had locked horns in that
struggle"

(p. 457).

Norris undermines his influence at the

end of the novel by allowing him, as before, to change his
mind several more times about his philosophical sympathies,
and, more importantly, to go away from his problems instead
of facing them.

Nor does Dyke’s response to trouble, to

descend into instinctual behavior utterly without human
will, represent Norris's viewpoint.

Dyke's end parallels

the conventional naturalism of McTeague, but before he
blames the railroad as a general force, "a certain feeling
of shame"

(p. 249) reminds him of his own guilt.

Unlike

McTeague, who bewilderedly submits to a fate he neither
understands nor controls, Dyke knows for a few moments that
his own decisions caused his ruin.
According to George W. Meyer, Norris expects Shelgrim,
the other characters, and the reader to "understand and then
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adjust himself to her [nature's] changeless laws," 6 8 thus
insuring "a society soundly based on potent nature and her
perdurable laws."
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Such an interpretation essentially

proclaims the power of instinct, heredity and environment so
prevalent in McTeague, but undercut by Norris in The Octopus.
In McTeague, Norris presents a character who adjusts himself
to nature's demands, eventually fleeing like a hunted animal
across a desert wilderness.
human progress.

Such behavior indicates no

In The Octopus, man-made forces— the mob,

the railroad trust, the economy, the press— make up the
forces that primarily affect man, though Norris also invokes
natural and intangible forces as well.

It seems, then, as

McElrath explains, that neither nature, nor mankind offers a
solution acceptable to Norris:
. . . it seems his intention to establish the fact
that there is no immediate solution to the problem
of inhumaneness in the economic order . . . . but,
regarding specific and immediately effective
remedies for the socioeconomic disaster in the San
Joaquin Va^Jey, Norris does not know how to
prescribe.
Norris tends to embrace whatever idea fits best metaphorically rather than literally,
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but since he's a novelist

and not an economist in this case we don't expect a program
to recover economic health, but rather a philosophy by which
to conduct life.
Does Norris then never supply an answer?

According to

Walcutt, no, because he never reconciles the contradiction
between fate and will.

Walcutt does not think that Norris

solves the problem he poses:

56

We are told that how the wheat is distributed does
not matter; we are almost persuaded that the
manner of its distribution is a part of nature's
larger plan . . . .
The problem of how people
should react to injustice is simply evaded, while
a vaguely religious affirmation of ultimate good
is offered to appease the emotions aroused by the
action.
Norris does solve the problem, and by following the guide
lines outlined in "The Novel with a 'Purpose,'" his solution
becomes clear.

Briefly, The Octopus satisfies the three

criteria Norris deems essential in the "best class" of
novels:

it tells, shows, and proves something. 73

It

achieves these goals through the use of "elemental forces
[that] contribute to the novel with a purpose to provide it
with vigorous action." 74

The purpose of these forces is

simply to clarify "the motives that stir whole nations;"
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to make the reader understand, not to demonstrate cruelty.
Additionally, events of the story must do "the preaching,
the moralizing," not the author,

76

nor dares the writer

become "really and vitally interested in the purpose"
his novel fail.

Finally,

77

lest

"the purpose novel always ends

unhappily," as The Octopus does, because "there is much pain
in [real] life," and the purpose novel "is a sincere transcription of life."
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Granted, the fuzzy approach to natural forces clouds
the matter.

One can select passages in The Octopus to

support man-made and natural forces as good, as bad, as
indifferent, or as vindictive.

James K. Folsom reconciles

the variance, emphasizing as I have the importance of
perception:

57

Whether nature is friendly or inimical depends
upon ourselves.
If we choose to ignore or wilfully
to misunderstand the duality at the heart of
things, the side of life we deny will inevitably
become hostile. Norris makes the point in The
Octopus as in^ c T e a g u e that what we don't know
will hurt us.
Folsom sides with characters like Mrs. Derrick and Presley,
who, on several occasions, rage at nature's deliberate
malevolence toward men who cross her.

He points out that

man needs to be aware of reality; otherwise he will suffer.
However, what McTeague and Trina don't know cannot hurt or
help them.

Norris has not created in McTeague characters

who think and act the way characters in The Octopus do.

Nor

has he allowed the lives of characters in The Octopus to be
dominated by natural, man-made, or instinctual force as in
McTeague.

McTeague never can know himself, but Annixter,

Magnus and Annie do, and, were they so inclined, Presley and
Vanamee might as well.

Norris presents several hopeful ways

of perceiving an apparently hopeless situation in The
Octopus, "fearlessly proving that power is abused, that the
strong grind the faces of the weak, that an evil tree is
still growing in the midst of the garden, that undoing
follows hard upon unrighteousness," but most importantly,
"that the races of men have yet to work out their destiny in
those great and terrible movements that crush and grind and
rend asunder the pillars of the houses of the nations."
Men must "work out" their problems themselves.
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To prefer

the "truth" of naturalistic determinism is to relinquish
one's freedom, and though Norris looks longingly at such a

58

solution, in the end, and almost despite himself, The
Octopus comes down on the side of free will.

Notes
Frank Norris.
The Letters of Frank Norris, ed.
Franklin Walker (San Francisco: Book Club, 1956, 1970),
p. 48.
2

Norris, Letters, p. 35.

3Norris, Letters, p. 48.
4
Donald Pizer, The Novels of Frank Norris (Bloomington,
London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1966), p. 114.
5
Some additional definitions of naturalism might be
useful.
Don Graham, in "Naturalism in American Fiction: A
Status Report" (cited fully in note 17), quotes Nelson
Algren to provide a most descriptive explanation, "the
writer’s task as a naturalist . . . is to dramatize the
claims on the common attention of ’people living without
alternatives’" (p. 6). Charles Child Walcutt, in American
Literary Naturalism: A Divided Stream (Minneapolis: Univ. of
Minnesota Press, 1956) , helpfully identifies determinism,
taboo, survival, and violence as four common themes in
naturalistic works (p. 21). Malcolm Cowley (see note 7)
defines naturalism in negative terms; it is not bad
journalism, nor "in depth" literature, it lacks historical
accuracy, it demonstrates no faith in reform (p. 145).
Cowley sums up naturalism as a literary movement in which
"men are ’human insects' whose brief lives are completely
determined by society or nature.
The individual is crushed
in a moment if he resists; and his struggle, instead of
being tragic, is merely pitiful or ironic, as if we had seen
a mountain stir itself to overwhelm a fly.
Irony is a
literary effect used time and time again by all the
naturalistic writers" (pp. 149-50).

g

Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American
Thought, Vol. 3 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1930),
p p . 323-4.
7
Malcolm Cowley, "A History of American Naturalism," in
A Many-Windowed House (Carbondale, Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 132-9.

g

Lars Ahnebrink, The Beginnings of Naturalism in
American Fiction, 1891-1903 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
1950), p. 414.
9
Christopher Wilson, "American Naturalism and the
Problem of Sincerity," American Literature, 54 (December,
1982) , 518.

■^Frederick J. Hoffman, The Modern Novel in America
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951), p. 36.
^ E r n e s t Marchand, Frank Norris: A Study (New York:
Octagon, 1942), pp. 50-1.
I do not agree that naturalism
necessarily has to be deterministic to be so considered, but
determinism is often an indication of naturalism.
12

Edwin Cady, The Light of Common Day (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1972), p. 49.
■^Cady, p. 49.
14 Norris, The Responsibilities of the Novelist (New
York: Haskell House, 1903, 1966), p. 215.
15 Frank Norris, "Zola as A Romantic Writer," The W ave ,
27 June, 1896, p. 3, quoted and identified by Franklin
Walker in Frank Norris: A Biography (New York: Russell and
Russell, 1963), p. 83.
16

Frederic T. Cooper, "Frank Norris' The Octopus," The
Bookman, 13 (May, 1901), 245-7, rpt. in Critical Essays on
Frank Norris, ed. Don Graham (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980),
p. 28. Norris's favorite creed, Cooper charges, is "that
realism and romanticism are, after all, convertible terms."
There is an element of truth in,this statement, but I refer
to the tendencies found in each.
17 Don Graham, "Naturalism in American Fiction: A Status
Report," Studies in American Fiction, 10 (Spring, 1982),
p. 8.
18
Norris, "A Plea for Romantic Fiction," in The
Responsibilities of the Novelist (New York: Haskell House,
1903, 1966), p. 220.
19
H. Willard Reninger, "Norris Explains The Octopus: A
Correlation of His Theory and Practice," American
Literature, 12 (May, 1940), p. 222.
20

Thomas Bacon, "The Last Book of Frank Norris,"
Impressions Quarterly, 4 (March, 1903), 12, identified and
quoted by Donald Pizer, The Novels of Frank Norris
(Bloomington and London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1966), p. 143.
21

Norris has another philosophical conflict to resolve,
that between fixed natural law and the arbitrariness of
impersonal forces, that is, fatalism.
Ahnebrink defines
fatalism to mean that "human life was not regulated by
natural laws, but was made irrational and illogical through
the operation of inevitable chance" (p. 185). Norris
employs elements of chance especially in McTeague, but in
The Octopus as well, an analysis of which would constitute a

separate paper.
Chance by no means dominates either story,
however, so I am inclined to think that Norris rejects
hard-line fatalism in favor of consistent, perhaps
eventually understandable, natural laws.
^Cowley, p. 133.
^Wilson, p. 527.
24
Pizer, Novels, p. 121.
25Walter Fuller Taylor, The Economic Novel m America
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1942), p. 299.
26

Richard Allen Davison, "Frank Norris's The Octopus:
Some Observations of Vanamee, Shelgrim and St. Paul," in
Literature and Ideas in America, ed. Robert Falk (Columbus,
Ohio Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 195-6.
27 This paper is largely about how different people
perceive the same situation, but it seems to me that they
all share a common method as described here by Norris.
In
The Responsibilities of the Novelist, Norris also emphasizes
personal impressions as the pinnacle of art:
"in the fine
arts we do not care one little bit about what life actually
is, but what it looks like to an interesting, impressional
man . . . .
His accuracy cuts no figure at all" (p. 226).
In The Octopus, Norris presents a number of interesting men,
some more impressionable than others, who tell the same
story in a way very free of the so-called naturalistic
constraints found in McTeague.
28
Warren French, Frank Norris
p. 106.

(New York: Twayne, 1962),

29

William L. Vance, "Romance in The Octopus," Genre, 3
(June, 1970), 112.
30 Norris treats gambling in The Octopus differently than
in McTeague. McTeague and Trina fall victim to the "sport
of chance" (p. 74); they are unpleasantly gambled with by
fate. Magnus gambles on his own quite successfully most of
the way through The Octopus, thus propounding the sense of
control by the characters in The Octopus. In the end, when
he becomes senile, it is not because of the sort of gambling
to which Vandover or Condy falls prey, or to the mysterious
kind of chance that traps McTeague.
He gets ample oppor
tunity to curb his love of gambling with his respect for
honesty? he has much greater control than any of Norris's
previous characters.
31

.
.
An unidentified leaguer points out Magnus's guilt m
thinking only of himself and his ranch, not the others:
"We— the rest of the leaguers— never were informed as to

what was going on . . . . 1 1m sorry for our president too,
. . . but I want to put myself on the record as believing he
did a hasty and inconsiderate think . . . it looks to me as
if the lives of our fellow citizens had been sacrificed, not
in defending all of our ranches, but just in defense of one
of them— Los Muertos" (pp. 385-6). Norris presents this
true statement without comment except to describe the
speaker as "a tall, clumsy man, half rancher, half politi
cian" (p. 385), thus conveying Lyman-like connotations and
indirectly discrediting him.
I think the man has hit on the
truth.
32

In McTeague, all actions, small and large, fall under
the control of predetermined forces.
In The Octopus, as
Norris moves away from naturalism, individuals handle
smaller concerns without the intrusion of external agencies.
33 Magnus arrives at the leaguers' meeting after Harran
dies fully prepared by "a sense of enormous responsibility,
of gravest duty" to "bear the responsibility of the fight"
(p. 389).
^ V ance, p. 115.
"^Norris, "Zola," p. 83.
36
Joseph McElrath, "Frank Norris's The Octopus; The
Christian Ethic as Pragmatic Response," in Critical Essays
on Frank Norris, p. 143.
37 Norris and his characters waver between the view that
nature is completely indifferent to human needs and
activities, and that it is indifferent only when man goes
along with its demands. Mrs. Derrick and Presley express
both views, as does Norris.
Since Norris never resolves the
question himself, my solution is that depending on a
character's outlook at the time, he may perceive nature as
either actively cruel to him or simply indifferent, though
not necessarily beneficial.
In The Octopus, in contrast to
McTeague, Norris gives his characters a choice about how
they wish to regard nature and its forces.
3 8Mrs. Derrick seems to be a victim of natural forces in
Norris's description of her attempt to stop Magnus from
joining the League at Annixter's barn dance. Mrs. Derrick,
"the feather in the whirlwind" (p. 199) , was "swept back
. . . [and] the world, like a colossal iron wedge, crushed
itself between" (p. 200). Norris doesn't need to include
this kind of naturalistic banter, but he indulges his
delight in the dramatic analogies of force, as he later
elaborates in Responsibilities (p. 28).
39

Pizer, Novels, p. 72.

40

Charles Child Walcutt, American Literary Naturalism, A
Divided Stream (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press,
1956), p. 143.
41 If one imposes forces on A n m x t e r and Hilma, milk
imagery works as well as wheat.
The Tress support human
beings nutritionally, like the ranchers with the wheat, but
they provide sustenance in dairy products.
Annixter's
fondest recollection of Hilma include repeated images of
"her large white arms, wet with milk, redolent and fragrant
with milk" (p. 120). He usually sees her in the dairy
making some sort of milk by-product.
In the view of the
feminine distrust of the wheat, demonstrated in particular
by Mrs. Derrick, milk symbolism lends itself better to the
gentler connotations of Hilma*s love for her husband and for
the child the two of them conceive.
Milk symbolizes mother
hood and infancy, whereas wheat is the food of adults.
But,
Norris does not need to include either force as anything
more than an analogy, because Annixter must do for himself
and not simply be acted upon by the force of the wheat or of
the dairy.
42
The word pledge has evil connotations in The Octopus
since Magnus's ruin commences when he "was pledged" (p. 207)
to the league.
43 Of course, the wheat field, too, has been prepared
step by step, and has certainly not come up without being
nurtured, but Norris stresses the suddenness in this
analogy, making a field "empty of all life" (p. 260)
suddenly blossom.
44 William B. Dillingham, Frank Norris: Instinct and Art
(Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1969), p. 187.
45 Norris, Responsibilities, p. 226. Norris adds in
Responsibilities that true romance is "not merely a
conjuror's truck box, full of flimsy quackeries, tinsel and
claptraps, meant only to amuse, and relying upon deception
to do even that" (p. 214).
It seems that unless Vanamee's
beliefs and actions are seen ironically, Norris himself
could be accused of dipping into the trick box.
^Wilson, p. 527.
47 A paradox evolves m this closeness, for although
Vanamee does commune with the forces of nature, he does
escape what Norris calls the "primordial energy flung out
from the hand of the Lord God himself" (p. 446).
The "mesh"
Magnus struggles against, like the animalistic lust that
temporarily traps Annixter, belongs, to that basic energy.
As he endeavors to summon Angele by masterfully exercising
his special powers, Vanamee is described as "surrendering
himself to the influences of the place" (p. 270).

Influences still affect him, but Vanamee himself does the
surrendering.
However, he never manages to take
responsibility for himself.
^ Vance, p. 120.
49 Norris feels rather strongly about the section on
Vanamee.
He writes to I. F. Marcossan, "It is the most
romantic think I've yet done.
One of the secondary subplots
is pure romance— oh, even mysticism, if you like, a sort of
allegory— I call it the allegorical side of the wheat
subject" (Letters, p. 67). The fact that Norris was
particularly excited about this section, and that Vanamee is
modeled on his friend Bruce Porter (Pizer, Novels, p. 125),
does not preclude the section from being an ironic statement
on Norris's part. Vanamee, ostensibly the epitome of the
man who has experienced much, has actually lived less than
Presley, who is all thought and little action.
50Norris, Responsibilities, p. 235.
51

Malcolm Cowley identifies irony as characteristic of
many naturalistic works (pp. 149-50), and goes on to
describe it as "a spectator's emotion, and it sets a space
between ourselves and the characters in the novel (p. 150).
Such an interpretation makes Vanamee seem even farther
outside the realm of social experience, since he not only
fails to connect with the other characters but with the
reader as well.
^ V ance, p. 127.
53Vanamee's personality is made up not only of a
communion with nature that enables him to summon others and
feel deeply, but also of a native intelligence strengthened
by college training.
He possesses some analytical ability,
at least enough so that Presley considers him worthy to
pronounce judgment on his poem "The Toilers" (pp. 265-6).
Clearly, then, Vanamee is intellectually capable of
interpreting a Bible passage correctly.
Emotionally,
however, he cannot, and instead chooses to twist the
quotation from Corinthians into fuel for his own very
personal fire.
54 Don Graham, The Fiction of Frank Norris (Columbia and
London: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1978), p. 108.
55 James K. Folsom, "Social Darwinism of Social Protest?
The Philosophy of The Octopus," Modern Fiction Studies, 8
(Winter, 1962-63), 397.
56
Folsom, p. 400.
^McElrath, p. 144.

58
Vanamee epitomizes human will triumphing over natural
force? it is through his strong determination and nightly
labors that he wins over Angele's daughter.
He doggedly
pursues a goal as dear to him as Magnus’s desire to lead,
and he achieves that goal as he could only in a novel free
of determinism.
But his achievement furthers only himself,
and the ironic consolation he offers falsely implies that
regardless of o n e ’s actions, everything will turn out all
right.
59
Granville Hicks, The Great Tradition (New York:
Macmillan, 1933), p. 173.
^ Vance, p. 132.
61

Early in the novel Presley hears the Muse which
stimulates thoughts that overwhelm him:
"stupendous ideas
for which there were no names drove headlong through his
brain (p. 39). A railroad engine interrupts this reverie,
which later recurs in slightly different form. After the
shootings, the names of the ideas, or facts in this case,
become apparent, as "monstrous things, huge, terrible, whose
names he knew all too well, whirled at a gallop through his
imagination" (p. 378).
Presley must write his thoughts and
experiences down.
The early vision is just that, a vision
marked by no experience or true feeling.
In the second
vision, the distressing words come to him.
If he chose to,
he could help others by making them aware of the issues that
upset him.
62

In "Salt and Sincerity" (Responsibilities) Norris
explicitly outlines the duty of the writer:
"If the modern
novelist does not understand the plain people, if he does
not address himself directly to them intelligibly and
simply, he will fail" (p. 282).
Presley does not act as
Norris prescribes, and he fails.
63
Mrs. Derrick also perceives nature "relentless, a
gigantic engine, a vast power, huge, terrible, a leviathan
with a heart of steel, knowing no compunction, no forgive
ness, no tolerance" (p. 130) when men go against it.
64

Graham, p. 121.

^French, p. 96.
^ Hicks, p. 173.
^McElrath, p. 140.
68
George W. Meyer, "A New Interpretation of The
Octopus," College English, 4 (March, 1943), 352.

69

Meyer, p. 359.

70

McElrath, p. 140.

71
Critics often base what they consider Norris’s failure
in The Octopus on inconsistent philosophy.
Allowing for his
exuberance and love of the melodramatic, it seems to me that
Norris grounds his work in consistent philosophical convic
tions which naturally change somewhat as he matures.
Thus,
McTeague and The Octopus do differ in theory, but not
completely; nor does Norris lose philosophical coherence in
either.
Donald Pizer, in Realism and Naturalism in
Nineteenth-Century American Literature (Carbondale,
Edwardsville: Southern Univ. Press, 1969, 1984), provides a
two part defense of Norris’s philosophical consistency.
He
interprets Norris’s approach toward his artistic characters
as one of fear, thus, "it is necessary to evaluate his
philosophical passages dealing with the artist at least in
part on the basis of the metaphoric impact of these passages
rather than entirely on the basis of their intrinsic
superficiality or melodramatic imagery" (p. 63). Also,
"although the novelist seems to be supplying in a
philosophical passage an interpretive key to the events he
is portraying, he may have a flase or superficial discursive
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